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Problens gf  thLqiritpbulldine. ig$gstrv
The crisis which the shlpbuiLding industry ls  going tbrough in
the EEC eountries, and whj-cli is  cl-early due to a fal-l in both Comnunity
and e>lie:::ia-.! ddile:]d, tr&6 L)?:rn ief-i-,.icred sirrce 1959 tn  a dl'op in
prodr-tc:i.;n i;i  ai:lr:i-r.rf e te-r:ir,i .:i.r'i .ri  a pei^c,jrta€ie of  world  prcduction.
In  19i5  the  ijEC s:i'ra.'?'e in  v;:;.1 i  p:r.cCucti.i,n i'ei.u::ned to  its  fornetr peak
of nearly 4tr1 but since then it  bas steadily declined, falli-ng fu 2A%
ln L964.
This le partly f.inked wltb a qualitative trend of denand.
AJ-though the Deeds siill-  include, a propo).tj.on of conventional shlps,
ther:e is  a gforiing g\Y.:,:ie5 to special t;rpe r."essels (comi:-'ined bulk
carj.ers and tanlcers, mei;hane carriers, eic*) of ever greater capacity
and of modern des5.gn better suited. to the requirenents of the shipping
companies.
fhus the average sf"ze of tankers hae aLnost quadrupl-ed in the Last
ten years.  As regards dry cargces, the avera.€ge tonnage of bulk
carriers has pract.j,.al-ly treb-ied.  The Japanriie, and. until  recentLy
the Sworlesrhave adapied then:iel-ves so well" to ihe quaLitative change in
demand that they have, if  nct a monopoLy, at least a considerable
advance i-n this sector.  Not so j;:l:e Ei'lC eo,;ntlies, whose wea.ker
position on the world narket in fact refl-ects'i;heir snall share in thl-s
neis gectot.  The Japanese and Swedish lead over EEC in the big-ship
sector is reflected in the average size of vessels ordered during the
fi"rst nine months of, 19541
Japan '.  258 vessels with a totaL gto6s tonnage of t+ 393 OOO,
Averaget 17 OOO toas.
Sweden |  26 vessels with a total- grosa tonnage of ]68 O0O.
Average; 14 0OO tons.
EEg  |  3g2 rressels *itt  " total  gr<166 tonnage of 2 a46 5OO.
Average: 5 ?OO tons.
Even though we have.no certatnty as to the future scaLe
of changes in nerchant fl.eets, 5-t is  safe to say that the chief market
which shipbuiLding  sirouid alnr at is this sector of ships technically
better adapted to requirenents, At present, however, the Conraunityrs
shipbutlding industry aeems for various reasons badLy geared to this
narket.
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This does not mean that the Cornmunity countries have done nothing
to cope with the situation,  But the fact that Japan a-ud Sweden were
first  in the field  and the eimultaneous  effect -  fel-t much more in this
sector than elsewhere - of nunerous favourabLe factors have ensured for
these two countries a coneid.erable  advance.
'Japan  and Swedetl seem to have a technol.ogical lead in
part5.cul-ar as regards the hutl dosignl autonation, speed, specialization
and profitability  of the ships they build.
huthermore production conditions are nore favourable in Japan and
Svreden than in the Comnunlty. In the EEC about 40 firms build. ocearl-
goin6 vessels, compared with 1.5 ln Japan (of which 9 account for \Afi ot
production) and 5 (96% of production) in Sweden.
P-
Among the advantages whlch Japan and Sweden






Cheaper suppl-lee,  guaranteect by agreenents, of primary naterials
and various requirenents (steeL plate);
Firrns are Less rnrlnerable and nore independent of narket
conditions.
As regard.s wages, aLthough it  is usuaJ- to strees the very low rates
of Japanese wagee in reLation to those in the lilest, it  must be noted
that by rationalizing the use of nanpower the Swedes have so reduced
vrage costs per unif, of production that at the end of L95J they were 2&
beLow Japa.nese costs and only haLf, those obtaining J-n f'rance and,
Germany.
Along with these natura^l disparities go various exceptional and
artificial  advantages enjoyed by the ehipbuilding industry in Japan:
(i)  ffre price of shlpts plate;
(ii)  hng-term credit facilities  for tonnage exported;
(iii)  ALd to rese6rch; (iv)  Strort-term credit facilities; (v) Insurance facilities; (vi)  Tax concessions; (vii)  Custorns proteptlon.
The combined effect of these support neaoures on costs has been
put by the Corrunisslon at I@/,
:
Study of the receat quaS.l"tative trend of worLd shipping seems to
indicate that EEC procluction wiLL only begin to pick up if  it  responde
to the requirements of buyers fron the angle of techno}ogical  progresa
on the one hand and of cost on the other,-5' P-
Tha rapid. and continual tT aa.ef;orrrertj-on -of mercbant f,leets in the
dJ.rection of better adaptation to spectfic requirements ehould stlnuLate
the building of tankers, ore shipsl combl-ned buLk camiers and tankers,
l-iquid cheurtcaLe camiers, combined petroL and liquld natural- gas
camiersl and shlps carrying car6, trucks aad containers,  Dimensions,
shapel degree of automation, speed (for nore frequent voyagee) and








o this end ehould enbody the lessons both of the
zation of, the Swedish and ,Iapanese yards and of the
prod.ucts and include inoentlves to appropriate
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increase, at  J-e
er of rationaLization the following lines of action,
y being followed at national leveL (!'rance, Italy)  but
te orientation to the needs of the narketl could be
authorities:
tr co-oPeration between yards, especially i.n
jointly-operated  nodern obsolete capacity by
ation investments, particularly where the oliL-
11 is  abandoned.l
posslbllities  for prefabrication;
n of yards to ship-1'epairing on1y, particularly
nt with other yards;
(e) conver n to the buildlng of coastaL or inLand waterway
and exchange of vesse].s
intere
(t)  Amal tion between ehipyards and dlversified industrial
groupsi
(g) conver to other work than ehipbullding or repairing.
kete for the greatest nunber of shipyarcls, a
uith specialization agreements
s between several yards;
po1lcy would therefore offer the best prospect of
r of those which wiLl have to be converted to other
d thus meet the urgent requirenents of regional policy
of conceru to certaLn Menber Statee.  Unavo{d,-
Id be undertaken in the franework of regi-onal-
udy of  the narket shouLd be nad.e before deciding upon
i.vities i.f d.isappointrnents sinlLar to those
nced wlth reLated industrtes (for instance heavy
to be avoLded.
so f,ar as Conmunity fleets tended, if  not to




types of ships (supertankersl bulk carriers, fast cargo liners,  etc.)
cot fa be given indirectly by channelling the funds appropriated to
shipping in most Membe.r $tatee towards the purchase of such ships.
Having regard to competitive conditions on the international
shipbuila{ng market the Corrnissionl  on L} April L965, proposed
imrnidiate hotOing action by the Community to safeguard the, industry
in the Six pending the working out of nore constructive solutions.
But any tationalizatlon  and conversion of Community shipyards
would call lor rnore far-reaching lntervention by the Comrnission.
The first  thing it  rnight do would be to harrnonize as far as possible
national ratlonalization and conversion neaaures. Thie would meall
workLng out a coherent approach to the probleme whictr would avold any
distortion of competition in the Comnunity hermful to the conmon
lnterest and ensule adequate transparency of the system in each concrete
co6€o fo this end the 
-Commission 
couLd lay dorvn nore detailed criterla
for the conpatibility of al.ds to the rational.ization  and conversion of
shipyardg gl.th .Article 92(3 c) of the Treaty.
An approach of thf.s kind rrrouLd obviously leave to th9^Menber States
and their-becentraLlzed authorities full  iniilattve  in trktng any
measurejs required.  C,bnsequently lts  effect would not go furthe:r than
to harmontze ttre irnpact of,'the rnlasures on the Connunity shipbuilding
rnarket.  Moreov€f,1 prJ.or stipulation of compatibtl-ity criteria  caanot
tn any way affect ifrl  obllgation to notify aid projects to -the 
Cornnis-
sion in conformity with lrticLe gtj)  of the Treaty. In addltion to
the advantage of nrore coherent action in this field withtn the Conmun{ty;
the proposed solution could aLso ensure greater certainty as to the
Legal. pcsition and nake it  possibLe to handLe the reLevant dossiers more
speedily.
The second approach could be for the Cornnunity to bear a greater
share in the financial burdens ental-led by rational-ization and conver-
slon.  From thi-s angle we should envisage the possibility of more
action by the European Investnent Bank and the Social Fundr either under
their prisent pot*'urs or in conformity with the proposals to increase the
effectivene6s of the European $ocial" I\rnd submitted by the Conmission to
the Council on 2? January L965,  fhis  eecond aspect of the Comrnissionfs
action would be only conpl-€mentary, iae. it  would be conditional on the
















Problbmes du aeot6ur de la  constructLon navale
La crL6e que traverse llindustrLe  navale dans Les paye de la  OEE, orlge qui a pour caua€ apparente une baLsse i  ta  fois  de la  demande
conmunautairer €t de la  demande ext,Srieure, ge traduit,  depuLs L959t par un recul  de La trrroduotlon, tan* en va}eur absolue quien porrrcentage
de Ia  production mondlale. La pari; ,ie l-a cEE; dans J-a p::ocluctLon
mondialer sPrbs avolr  retrouvd en 1-{}35 un maximrui' de prbs de 4A/o nta
oesg6 de cldoroltre enguJ.te pour attoindre  zo % en r.964.
Ce ph6nombne est lid  en partie  a ltdvolution  qualitatlve  de La
demande. Si  oel-l"e-cl reste  faLte dlune part  de navires cJ-aes:lqua€,r
elle  coraprend dgalement, et  €n-proportLon touJoura plus grandee dea navlros de types partioull,ers  (tranoporteurs coubLnis de vra.c et dthydrocarburesr udthanierg, eto.  ),  de capaoltd oroiasanter et  de
oonoeptLon mgderne, rdpondant ml.eux aux beso{ns des arnrateurs,
A"tnsL, la- taLlle  ?,!oyenn€ du p6trolLer  a presque quadrupld dana lee dlx  derntbrea ann6esi €n c€ qui. conoerns lee  carjaisons sbchesT Le tonnage moyen dee tra"nsporteurs de vrac a pratlquement tripl6.  drl el les JaponaLs atl  Jusqulb une date rdoenter lee Suddoiel €e sont
adapt6s h. 1a urutatLon qualLtatl.ve de J"a demande, "tr point  de odndficier
dans ce secteur sinon d,un monopole de fait  du nroJ.ns dfune avance oonsicl6rable, il  nten est pas de ndme dee pay6 de l.a CEE, dont le  reoul-
cutr 1.€ marohd rnondLal tradu{t  en ddgtnltive  Ia  faib1e partioipatLon











totaJ. de 4 393 OOO tJb noy€nne I l?  OOO
total  de  358 OOO tJb moyenn€ r 14 O0O




Ivl6ne si  on n€ possbde au.oune certitude  guant I  LtJ.mportanoe future  du phdnombne de nutation  de la  flotter-  on peut affirmer  que
Le prinoipal- marohd eur J.equel Ia  construction navale doit  mj.ser est oonst{tu6 par oe secteur des navires technologiquenrent  nieux adaptda
a.ux beso{ner Orl  }  ltherre  actueIle1 lrLndustrLe navale comnunautaLre
eembr.e ponr deo raigons diverseel mal adaptde e oe march6.
,/,FEF
Non pal  que face e cette  sltuatJ.on f,Len nrait  6tA falt  dans les
peys de La ComnunautC.  Mais ltant6rioritd  dos efforts  Japonais
et  su6doia et  la  converg€nce beaucoup pJ.us effLcionte  qufaLllenrst
dtun ensenble de facteurs favoriblea,  ont asoufd oea deux pays
dtune avanoe oonsid6rabl-er
Les Japonaie et  les Suddolc semblent en particuLier  UdndfLoLer
d t une avanc€ technoLogLque dane les  domalnes sulvants t  La for'nre
dos navitresl leur  automatJ.sationl  l.eur rapidttdy  leur  rentabill,t6
et  leur  spdoJ.alieation.
Dlautre partl  les  condit{one de production sont
au Japon of  en Su&de qu€ dane l.a domnnunarrtd.  Dane La
pJ.ue f,avorabJ.es
CEE, une
quarantaine de firmes ae partagent  la  production de navi.res
de haute mer contre gulnzo au Japon (oont neuf interviennent  pour
Bo ')L dene cette production)r  et  slx  (poot 96f)  en $ubde.
Parrni J-es avantages que peuvent ilrer  les Suddols et  J.es
Japonaie de oette  concentratl.on pLus lmportanteI on peut cLter  i
F irabaiss€nent gdndfal dee prJ.x de revlentS
J.rapprovLsionnement  garantL et  b meilLeur compter par suite
d!accorCs, deg matibres premLbres et  deg diffdrentes  fournl.tures
{tdre  d tacler};
l-a nolndre vulndrabllit6  des entrepriseg et  Leur rrolndre
cl6pendance des condltLone du marchd.
En ce qui  concotr:ne Les sal.a:Lresr si  lton  insiste  habituel-
Leiiont sur le  taux trbs  bas des salaires  troratres japonais par
rai:port  aux ealairee  oocldentarrrcr 11 faut  notor gue lss  Su6doLsg
en iatlonal{sant  ]-tutiLl.eation  de la  main-dtoeuvrer ont abaLssd
Le co0t dee eal.alres par unit6  de productJ"on tant  et  si  bJ.en
qutil  se Eitua{t  en Subael fln  1963, *  Zo % au-aessorls ctres oodte
Japonais et  6tatt  de mo{ti6 inf6rl.eur  aux co0ts frangais et
al.lsnande.
A ces dlspartt6s  natureLlee staJoutent dlvera avantagee
excepttonnels et  artLfLcJ-elg dont t6n6fLcle au Japon Lllnclustrle
de Ia  construot{on navalo i
-  ]"e prl.x de la  tdle  navale;
1es faciLLt6s  de cr6dit  b Long terme pour les  navlres
export6e y
Les aides I  ta  recherche  1
Les faailit6a  de orddit  a court  ternre;
Les facilitds  dans ].e domal.ne des assurances i
Les privilbges  fl'scaux;
La protectlon  douanlbre.
Ltincldence de c€s rilesuf,€s de 6outl.a  a  616 ohlffr6e  A 10'F
par la  trer:racloo.,"  :  t'  t'
./,Conpte tenu de
et les rroyens d rune
ccirversions A 1a
oeiies  provenant
Ltdtude cle lrdvoLutLon qual"itative  16cente de I'a flotte
rilonClale Laiese A. penser que La CEE nlamorcera une reprise  de aa
productlon qutautant que ceLl-e-ci rdpondral sur les  pJ.ane du
;;;;ti"-terrrn"r"gique  dtune part,  ael  prix  de revLent cltautre partt
aux begoins dea acheteursr
La tnanaformation raplde et  contLnueLlo des flottes  dans Ie
sens drune meilleure adaplation b des besolns ep6oifiquesr dol.t
lnciter  & la  construction de p6troli€f,Br  mlndrallers,  tra:rsporteura
combl-n6e de vr:ac et dthydrocarbureg, transporteurs  de produite
chi::1j.ques LLquides, traneporteurs  combinds de p6trole  et de gaz
i:aturd- J.lquide, transporteure  de voitures r. de camions t  d€
containers. Lee unitds dolvent dgalec.rent rdpondre par leur  taill"et
Leur fornel  J.eur de6rd cltautomatlsationl. 19ot rapidit6  permettant
une rotetion  accrue, et  leUr rentabl-Lj.t6, A des condLtions
cl t exploitatlon  avantage[s€E  1
Quaurt aux moyena, stinspirant  tant  de lrorganisatl"on efficace
Ces cl:antiere su6Olfs ot  Japonais que des qualitis  de leurs  produitsl
ils  devraient comporter des J'ncitations b utre ratlonallsation
apr:ro;:ri6e des l"netaltations  de producti,on auesl blen que des
inci,clttone  e la  constructl.on de nouveau)t tylres de navJ-res.
Sur Le plan de ta  ratLonal-isatlon,  Les inl-tiatlves  sulvantes
pcurralent faire  ItobJet  drun encouragenent par J.es pouvolrs publiost
initLatives  qui ont 6ta d6i|  amorcdes sur l-e plan national
iF"*r"",  Ita1ie),  mais Bane ltassise  cltune orientatlon  r6pondant
au:c i:esoins du marchd  3
-  fusion ou coop6ration entre chantiera,  notarr,rent dans Ie  but
Ctun  rernplaceraent de capacit6e v6tustes par des installations
::oderncs exploit6es on comruurri
i;.vestlsserrents de reodernisatlon notar.rnent ceuf, qui gont &ccoErpa-
6nds par trn abandon de caLes ddraod6es;
-  6tuie  des possibil-it6s  et  des conditions drune pol:ltlque  de
;:r6f abrication;
-3-
cette  gituatJ.on, quels pourralent 6tre  lee buts
politique  communautai.re  ?
seule actLvlti  de riparatLon navale, notanrnent
d I un aocorcl avec d I autre s chantlers I
con'/€rsions A. ta  constructj.on de cabotage ou de navigatl'ibn
fLuviale,  notarareent cellee  provenant r.lf un accord de ep6oialisation
a.vec 6change drintdrets  entre pJ.usieurs chantiersi
-  i?lollV€tilents de concontration errtre chantiers et  grouPes
inc.ustrLe].s I  actl.vltds  dl.versifidesi
F conversion A. cles ad.titds  induetrielLes  autreg que La construction
ou r6paration  navale.
Une politique  comnuRautaire rationnelle  auraLt donc le  plus
c1e chai1cee r €r  assurant des ddbourchdg au plus grand nombre de
chanbiers, de lLmiter  le  noncbre de  ceux qul deuaignt 6tre  convertie
a. c,rautres activit6s  et  donc tle rdpondre aux inp6ri'tJ-fs de politique
re.s,fcnaf e qui p"6o".opent certalns Etats  menbree . Les conver"on" 
.r,-4-
lndlspensalrles devraLent 6tre  entrjprLaes dans L-e cadre des projranuiles
rdgionaux. Une analJr"se du crarchd devrait  pr6o6d,er J-e choLx deE aotivitds
de reiepJ.aoeraent afin  dr6viter  des ddi:oires l"dentJ.ques e oeux enregis-
trds  i. ce jour  dans le  donaine des activit6s  ttrapproah6estt (par
1  exeml:le g,rosse chaudronnerie  ). v $ur Le deuxibme pJ.an, dans la  siesure otr Les flottes  cororflunautalres
tendraicnt  sinon &. slaccrottrel  du moins l  ae modernl-ierr des lncida-
I tions  I  ia  constructLon c1e nouveaux types da navires (superpdtrolJ.ersy
buiLk-carriersr cargos rapJ-des de 1l.gne, etc. ) pourraient 6tre  donndeso de
fagon 'iniirecte,  en or{entant  J.es cr6dLts budg6taires octroyds dans la
pluirart  c1es trtats  membree en faveur des armements nationaux vers
ltachat  de te].s navires.
*
Ltdvolution  dee conrl{tions de conourrenoe eur Le rrarchd interna*
tlonal  de la  co.nstrauati.on'nava-Le  a aniren6 la  ConruissLon b proposer 6ans
d6Lai et ra6me Lsoldmentl en date du L3 avriJ. L965p un€ initlatl,ve
& prendre Lr.mddiatement par la. Comnnr,nautd et  ceLa pour sauvegarder
la  construction naval.e de la  doun'rrunaut6 en attendant Lt6Laboratj.on
de eolutions pl-us constructives.  11 aragissaJ-t de rresures
cotrservatoires "
iia1.s 1de probl&nee de rationall,sation  et  de conversion des
chantiers nava].o colniunautaires appellent un€ intervention  plus
6tendue de La Coumiegion. Le premier rdle  qui pourrait  itui  6tre
d6voLu seraLt dtharmohl.ser  dans la  i:.iesure du possJ-ble Les mesures
natlonaLes en faveur de La rationallsatLon  et de la  oonversion des chan -
tiers  nava]-s, 11 stagiral-t  en ]-tofaumence dt6laborer une ai:proche
cohdrente des problbr.res consid6r6s gul 6vlteraLt  toute distorsion
de concurrenoe dans l.a Communarrtd oontraire  e ltintdrdt  commurt et  gul
assureralt un€ transpafenco satJ.efai.aante du systbme dans chaquo oas
dlap.:,licat{on. A cet effet,  la  Cor:rnigl;Lon pourrait  pr6ciser  dAvantage
Les critbrcs  de oorapatibl.J-J.t6 des aLdes b ta  rationaLJ.sation et 5 ta
cornrersion des chantLera €n regard des dlsposJ.tLone de .Lrart,  7? $ 3.
du Trait6.
Une approche de ce genre La1sse dvider.rnrent au:( Stats nembres et  S
Leurs r:cuvoirs ddcentralisds la  compJ.bte initlatl"ve  clrarrdter  6ventuel-
ldment l-es:::esures clont tl  stagit,  Son effet  ost par oon66guent 1init6
A f'thar::ronj.;at1on  de ltfuepaot de ces lnesur€s 6ventuelles aur J.e marchC
Gotxl,"illr1&Lrtaire de la  oonatructLon navale. Far aj.l].eurs, ].a ddfinitj.on  au
prdalable Ces crttbreg  de compatlbiiit6  ne peut nodif,Ler en rien
llobligatj.on  de notifier  1es proJete drai-des Ila  Comciission pr6vue e
.Lrarticle  93 $:  du trait6.  Outre llavantage drune neilLeure coh6rence
des interventlons  dans ce domaLne & ltl.ntdrLeur  de ].a Comr:runaut6r ]-a
solutlon  propos6e pourrait  dgal-ernent assurer urxe pJ.us grande sricurit6
juri.i,iq.ue en 1a matLbre et pourralt  enfin  permettre de traiter  Les
doesiers y aff6rents  av€c une pLus gfande c6Ldrit6.
Le deuxibrae moyen pouruaJ-t €tre  un€ plus large particlpation  do la
Comnrunaut€ aux chargee financibres  d6ooulant des ratLonalisations  et
conversions des cha.ntiers navals, 11 faudral.t e c€ propos concevoiq une
lnter-sention accrU€ de la  Sangue europ6ege dtlnvestissenent et du Foncls
eociall  soit  dans J.e cadre de leurs  attrl,butions  actuelles,  soLt dans
ce1ul ces propoeitions prdsent6ee paf fa  Comr,risston au Conseill  Le 27tL,
65, et visant  e aacrottre  lleffica"ftA  dcs lnterventlons  du  Fonds sooLal
europ6en. AinsL congu, ce second voLet dog interventions  cle la  Comrti.ssi.on
nlaurait  clutun caractbre eompJ.rdrrentairol crAst-4,-dire qutJ.J. resteraLt
suborConnd A. ta mls€ en oeuvf,e dtautres moyerra de finanoeraent et  qutJ"l no
poremait ddcouler dtJ-nitlat{ves  proprea de La OommJ.asl.on.